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CALIFORNIA V. TEXAS: THE 
DENOUEMENT OF THE 




In 2008, forty-four million Americans lacked health insurance.1 The 
Affordable Care Act (ACA or “The Act”),2 the Obama 
Administration’s seminal legislative achievement, created a federally-
facilitated marketplace where Americans could purchase quality 
health insurance at an affordable price, regardless of any pre-existing 
conditions.3 Expanding consumer access to the health insurance market 
was an expensive undertaking, and the ACA assigned most of those 
costs to the federal government.4 As for substantive reforms, the ACA 
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 2.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.) 
 3.  See Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit 
Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 Aʟʙ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 241, 283, 
294 (2010) (explaining several ACA reforms). 
 4.  See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018) (requiring companies with more than a certain number of 
full-time equivalent employees to provide health coverage or pay a penalty). See also President 
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of the Health Insurance 
Reform Bill (Mar. 23, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.white house.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-health-insurance-reform-bill) (noting that 
the ACA “lift[s] a decades-long drag on our economy” and extends coverage throughout the 
country). 
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mandated that health insurance issuers5 accept any eligible individual 
who applies for health insurance6 (known as the guaranteed issue 
requirement) and that health insurance policies within a given 
geographic region be offered to all individuals at the same price 
regardless of pre-existing conditions (known as the community-rating 
requirement).7 Furthermore, the ACA prohibited employers from 
charging individuals a higher premium based on their health status.8 
The individual mandate required all Americans to obtain health 
insurance or pay an associated tax penalty equivalent to two and a half 
percent of household income.9 The ACA became fully operative in 
2016, but was substantially rolled back in 2017 after the enactment of 
the Tax Cut and Jobs Act rendered the penalty zero – effectively 
eliminating the ACA’s only enforcement mechanism.10 
In February of 2018, Texas and nineteen other states filed suit 
against the federal government seeking to have the entire ACA struck 
down. In the consolidated case California v. Texas, the Court is 
considering four questions: First, whether Texas and the individual 
plaintiffs have standing to challenge the individual mandate; Second, 
whether the Tax Cut and Jobs Act11 renders the individual mandate 
unconstitutional; Third, whether the rest of the ACA can stand even if 
the mandate is unconstitutional; Finally, if the entire ACA is found 
invalid, whether the Act should be unenforceable nationwide or 
whether it should only be unenforceable as to the individual plaintiffs 
in the suit.12 
I.  FACTS 
In 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
ACA’s individual mandate (§ 5000(A))13 and characterized the fee for 
 
 5.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-12-768, Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act: Estimates on the Effect on the Prevalence of Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage (2012).  
 6.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a) (2018). 
 7.  See Mark A. Hall, Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 Hᴏᴜs. 
L. Rᴇᴠ. 1029, 1034–35 (2014) (describing the Affordable Care Act’s mechanisms for universal 
insurability).  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).  
 10.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2054-58 (2017). 
 11.  Id.; see also Josh Blackman, Undone: The New Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare, 
23 Tex. Rᴇᴠ. L. & Pᴏʟ. 1, 28–51 (2018) (The Act eliminated the penalty for individuals who chose 
to not obtain health insurance on a state or federal exchange). 
 12.  Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 393 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 13.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012). 
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not purchasing health insurance as a tax rather than a penalty.14 In 2017, 
a Republican-controlled Congress amended the ACA with the Tax Cut 
and Jobs Act,15 reducing the tax penalty for remaining uninsured to 
zero dollars, thus nullifying any real effect of the individual mandate. 
The remainder of the ACA was left intact. 
Texas, several other states,16 and individual plaintiffs filed a lawsuit 
in federal court arguing that because the penalty was zero dollars, it 
could no longer be characterized as a tax.17 For that reason, the 
plaintiffs argued, the provision was untethered to Article I and thus 
outside the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers.18 California, the 
District of Columbia, and other states19 joined the lawsuit, arguing that 
the individual mandate remained a valid exercise of Congress’ power 
to “lay and collect taxes”20—reiterating the Court’s reasoning in NFIB 
v. Sebelius.21 
The Northern District of Texas held that the individual mandate 
was unconstitutional and inseverable from the rest of the ACA, 
overturning the ACA in its entirety.22 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s holding as to the individual mandate’s 
unconstitutionality but remanded the issue of severability to the district 
court.23 Severing the mandate from the rest of the ACA would preserve 
those provisions of the Act that could operate independent of the 
individual mandate.24 But a determination that the individual mandate 
was inseverable would invalidate the entire ACA. 
The United States House of Representatives, California, D.C., and 
the other Petitioner states filed a petition for the Supreme Court to 
 
 14.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 702 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 15.  26 U.S.C. §§ 164(a)(1)-(3), (b)(5). 
 16.  These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. 
 17.  Brief for the Federal Respondents at 8, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (Nos. 
19-840 & 19-841). 
 18.  Brief for Plaintiffs at 5, Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-
10011). 
 19.  These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. The joined parties also include Andy Beshear, 
the Governor of Kentucky, and the District of Columbia. 
 20.  U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 21.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 702 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 22.  Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 23.  Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 401−02 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 24.  Id. at 403.  
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intervene before the district court could hear the severability 
arguments.25 Texas, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the other State 
Respondents objected to their petition for certiorari.26 The Supreme 
Court ultimately granted cert to decide whether the ACA’s individual 
mandate is unconstitutional, and if so, whether it is severable from the 
rest of the Act.27 
 II.  LEGAL HISTORY 
In 2012, the Court decided the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate provision of § 5000(A), which is also at issue in California v. 
Texas. The provision required individuals without health insurance to 
pay a “shared responsibility payment.”28 Congress, however, described 
the “shared responsibility payment” not as a “tax” but as a “penalty.”29 
The Court determined that although Congress (and President 
Obama) had described the shared responsibility payment as a penalty, 
rather than a tax,30 these statements were not binding for the purposes 
of constitutional interpretation.31 The Court upheld the mandate under 
the taxing power, noting that Congress has the authority to present 
individuals with a choice: either buy health insurance or pay an 
alternative tax.32 In Sebelius, the Court concluded that § 5000A would 
exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause if it were 
understood as requiring individuals to purchase health insurance.33 The 
Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate commerce, but what 
 
 25.  Texas v. United States, No. 19-1001, Order (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019).   
 26.  Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 17, at 8 (discussing the federal 
government and individual states’ opposition to Petitioner’s motion).  
 27.  Motion to Expedite Consideration of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and To 
Expedite Consideration of This Motion, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (Nos. 19-840 
& 19-841). California filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court by January 3, 
2020 asking for the case to be heard on an expedited schedule “because of the practical 
importance of the questions presented for review and the pressing need for their swift resolution 
by this Court.” See also Response of the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petitioners; 
Motions to Expedite Consideration of the Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) 
(Nos. 19-840 & 19-841) (Texas and the other respondent states filed a petition in February 2020 
urging the Court to deny expedited review as it was not ripe for review).  
 28.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (2018).  
 29.  Id. § 5000A(b), (g)(2).  
 30.  See ABC NEWS, President Obama in 2009: Mandate is Not a Tax, YOUTUBE (Jun. 30, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0ZUBMqMnWs; see also Byron Tau, Obama 
Campaign: It’s a penalty, not a tax, POLITICO (June 29, 2012), 
https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2012/06/obama-campaign-its-a-penalty-not-a-tax-
12772.  
 31. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012).  
 32.  Id. at 574. 
 33.  Id. at 572. 
SEREIX COMMENTARY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2021  9:20 PM 
2021] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 21 
Congress cannot do is require individuals to “become active in 
commerce” by purchasing health insurance.34 The Court upheld the 
individual mandate, requiring all uninsured individuals to maintain 
minimum essential coverage or pay a price, as a valid exercise of the tax 
power.35 
Under the principle of constitutional avoidance, if there are two 
possible interpretations of a statute—one unconstitutional and one 
valid—the Court must adopt the construction which saves the Act.36 
Construing § 5000A as a whole, it was “fairly possible” to read the 
provision as imposing a tax on taxpayers who do not have health 
insurance, and the Court upheld the mandate.37 Consequently, the 
Court left the severability question for another day. 
In King v. Burwell, the Court reviewed the ACA provision that 
allocates individuals’ tax credits for the purchase of health insurance 
on state and federal healthcare exchanges.38 The ACA creates state-run 
healthcare exchanges but also stipulates that should a state choose to 
not establish an exchange, “the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services will create ‘such Exchange.’”39 In King, the plaintiffs argued 
that individuals who had purchased their insurance on a federal 
exchange were barred from receiving tax credits.40 Textually, the ACA 
only provided tax credits to citizens who had purchased insurance 
through state exchanges, rather than federal exchanges.41 Nevertheless, 
the Court interpreted exchanges “established by the state” to include 
federal agency-created exchanges. 42 As a result, the Court recognized 
subscribers to HHS exchanges as eligible for tax credits.43 
This case reinforced the ACA’s central purpose: expanding access 
to health insurance to all Americans. Seven and a half million people 
in the thirty-four states that used the federal exchange would have lost 
their health insurance coverage if the Supreme Court determined that 
the subscribers to agency-created exchanges were ineligible for tax 
credits.44 Monthly premiums for these 7.5 million individuals would 
 
 34.  Id. at 550, 552. 
 35.  Id. at 574. 
 36.  Id. at 562 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)). 
 37.  Id. at 563. 
 38.  King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 479 (2015).   
 39.  42 U.S.C. § 18031(b).  
 40.  King, 576 U.S. at 474–75.  
 41.  26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)-(c). 
 42.  King, 576 U.S. at 498. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  The Day After King v. Burwell, Cᴏᴍᴍᴏɴᴡᴇᴀʟᴛʜ Fᴜɴᴅ (Mar. 4, 2015), 
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have increased on average by 47 percent as healthy people dropped 
their coverage.45 These increased premiums would have significantly 
altered the cost-benefit calculus of millions: People across the country 
would have chosen not to enroll over paying the higher out-of-pocket 
expenses that the ACA was specifically designed to mitigate. 
III.  CALIFORNIA V. TEXAS 
A.  Standing 
The first issue in California v. Texas is whether the Respondent-
Plaintiffs have standing to bring the suit. The doctrine of standing arises 
out of Article III’s case and controversy requirement and “not only 
serves to limit which persons may bring a lawsuit” but has also 
“developed into a larger cultural doctrine, concerned with the role of 
the courts in a democratic society.”46 To satisfy Article III’s standing 
requirements, a plaintiff must have suffered “an injury in fact that is 
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant” and is 
“likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”47 
Under the federal standing doctrine, Respondent-plaintiffs (Texas 
joined by nineteen other states, and the two individual plaintiffs) bear 
the burden of showing that they satisfy each element of standing.48 
Petitioners argue that none of the Respondents have standing to 
challenge the ACA’s constitutionality. The Individual Respondents 
have not been harmed by the statute because it does not require them 
to purchase health insurance.49  When standing is addressed at the 
summary judgment stage, a plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations 
and must set forth an affidavit and actual evidence.50 
First, Petitioners argue that neither the individual nor the State 
Respondents have established any legally cognizable harm.51 Prior to 
the enactment of TCJA, individuals would have had to buy insurance 
on an ACA exchange or pay an annual tax penalty. But because the 
TCJA lowered the individual mandate penalty to $0, this amendment 
 
https://medium.com/@CommonwealthFund/the-day-after-king-v-burwell-88907f633c5a. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 417–18 (Iowa 2008). 
 47.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 48.  Id. at 561. 
 49.  Brief for the Petitioners at 18, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840). 
 50.  Id. See also Standing, Bʟᴀᴄᴋ’s Lᴀᴡ Dɪᴄᴛɪᴏɴᴀʀʏ (11th ed. 2019) (defining standing as “[a] 
party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right”).  
 51.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 16. 
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to § 5000A eliminated the provision’s sole enforcement mechanism. 
The lower court disagreed—finding that when Congress enacted the 
TCJA, it transformed the individual mandate into a command that 
Sebelius had held as unconstitutional.52 Second, Petitioners argue that 
even if the individual mandate was a command to purchase insurance 
after the 2017 amendment, the Respondents would nonetheless lack 
standing because they would not face any adverse legal consequence 
for disobeying the command to purchase health insurance.53 In Babbitt 
v. Farm Workers, the Court noted a Plaintiff must “demonstrate a 
realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s 
operation or enforcement.”54 Prior to the zeroing of the penalty, the 
Court stated that paying the shared responsibility payment to the IRS 
was the only negative consequence of foregoing health insurance.55 
Therefore, violating the “command” to purchase health insurance 
would trigger no legal ramifications.56 Third, Petitioners argue that even 
if individuals felt compelled to buy health insurance (even absent legal 
consequences for choosing to forego such insurance),57 any 
concomitant financial “harm” would be “self-inflicted.”58 
The Petitioners also contend that, likewise, the State Respondents 
have not established standing.59 The State Respondents argue that the 
individual mandate imposes two financial harms to support standing. 
First, Respondents claim that according to the CBO report, individuals 
will obtain health insurance, “solely ‘out of a willingness to comply with 
the law’” and enroll in Medicaid or Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) to fulfill insurance requirements.60 Second, states bore 
 
 52.  Id. at 17.  
 53.  Id. at 16. 
 54.  442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (The Court discussed the threshold for determining when a 
plaintiff’s injury constitutes a “direct injury” as a result of the statute’s operation or 
enforcement.). 
 55.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 15. 
 56.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 568 (2012) (“Neither the Act nor 
any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond 
requiring a payment to the IRS.”). 
 57.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 23. 
 58.  Id. at 15 (citing King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015)).  
 59.  The states that are a party to the suit will be referred to as “State Respondents”, as 
opposed to individual person plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as “individual Respondents.” 
 60.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 21; see also Brief for Respondent/Cross-
Petitioner States at 10, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840) (citing CBO 2008 
REPORT at 9−10; CBO, REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE: AN 
UPDATED ESTIMATE, at 1, 3 (Nov. 8, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/CBO2017Report (CBO 2017 
REPORT) (describing the increase to States’ Medicaid expenditures and other fiscal harms 
incurred by the States)).   
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increased administrative costs to report, manage, and track insurance 
coverage.61  The State Respondents contend that the amended § 5000A 
would coerce some state employees to purchase health insurance.62 To 
establish standing under either theory, the State Respondents had to 
introduce evidence that there was a “likelihood” or “substantial risk” 
that people would enroll in state-run healthcare exchanges because of 
the amended § 5000A.63 
The Petitioners argue that Respondents did not provide evidence 
that the individual mandate would inflict any fiscal injury once the tax 
was set to zero.64 The Respondents merely presented declarations from 
officials who described the costs and burdens of the ACA as a whole—
which was not enough to satisfy the evidentiary burden.65 While the 
Respondents did introduce expert testimony, they did not present 
evidence of a concrete fiscal injury.66 
Individual Respondents argue that they have standing because the 
ACA curtails insurance coverage options and raises insurance costs, 
thus imposing an injury on them.67 State Respondents relied on the 
Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the ACA caused “fiscal injuries as 
employers” subject to various ACA requirements.68 The brief also 
noted that even if the state plaintiffs did not have standing, the case 
could still proceed because the individual plaintiffs have standing.69 
State Respondents focused on the low burden to justify standing, 
emphasizing that the Court requires that a plaintiff only show a 
sufficient stake in the outcome of the case.70 The “quantum of the 
injury” does not matter, and Article III “requires no more than de facto 
causality.”71 They urge the Court to affirm the Fifth Circuit ruling on 
the basis that the record contains plenty of evidence showing that the 
 
 61.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 21.  
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Brief for State Respondents at 6, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (Nos. 19-
840 & 19-841) (noting that removing the individual mandate from 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) would 
cause a “market-wide adverse-selection death spiral”)). 
 64.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 22. 
 65.  J.A. at 79–191, 339–63, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (Nos. 19-840 & 19-
1019). 
 66.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 24.  
 67.  Brief for State Respondents, supra note 63, at 17.  
 68.  Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 384 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 69.  Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 17, at 7. 
 70.  Brief for State Respondents, supra note 63, at 16 (citing Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, 803 (2015)). 
 71.  See id.; see also Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019) (quoting 
Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
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individual mandate increased costs to states and employers.72 
B.  Constitutionality 
Petitioners argues that the individual mandate is constitutional 
because it does not command Americans to purchase health insurance. 
Petitioners cite the longstanding presumption that Congress legislates 
with constitutional limitations as its guideposts.73 And it is assumed that 
when Congress amends a statute, it is “full[y] cognizan[t]” of the 
Court’s prior interpretation of the statute.74 When Congress amended 
the mandate in 2017, the only substantive change made was to reduce 
the alternative tax to zero. Petitioners nevertheless contend that even 
with the tax at zero, the mandate is still a tax because it “provides a 
structure through which future taxpayers could be directed to pay a 
tax.”75 Therefore, because Congress could increase the tax in the future, 
the individual mandate still arises out of Congress’s tax power in 
Article I.  On the other hand, Respondents argue that “future taxpayers 
could [always] be directed to pay a tax” if they refuse to purchase health 
insurance now and Congress later decides to impose a non-zero tax 
onto those who do not comply.76 Therefore, the Respondents posit that 
the zeroed-out penalty is only a temporary panacea employed to 
illustrate a lack of enforcement mechanism which can easily be 
amended in the future to impose a tax on Americans. 
Petitioners adopt the view that because the TCJA eliminated the 
penalty, there are now no consequences for choosing to forego health 
insurance.77 The individual mandate became merely an expression of 
“national policy or words of encouragement.”78 Additionally, 
Petitioners contend that the word “shall” is permissive and does not 
necessitate a command; Therefore “shall” would mean that each state 
would have the opportunity to establish its own exchange.79 Likewise, if 
a State did not establish an Exchange, the federal government would 
do so.80 Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, because there 
 
 72.  Brief for State Respondents, supra note 63, at 17. 
 73.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 26. 
 74.  Id. (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)). 
 75.  Brief for State Respondents, supra note 63, at 26.  
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 19. 
 78.  Id. at 28 (citing Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 416 (5th Cir. 2019) (King, J., 
dissenting)).  
 79.  Id. at 30 (citing Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020)) 
(noting legal writers sometimes use “shall” to mean “should”). 
 80.  Id. at 31 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1)).  
SEREIX COMMENTARY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2021  9:20 PM 
26 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 16 
is more than one plausible interpretation of the mandate, the 
Petitioners argue that the “better reading is that Section 5000A now at 
most encourages Americans to purchase health insurance, but does not 
require them to do so or impose any legal consequence if they do not.”81 
The Respondents endorse the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional. Respondents invoke Sebelius, 
which noted that Congress cannot, for example, use its power to order 
Americans to buy a new car or broccoli.82 Even though the penalty is 
now zero, the Respondents contend that the individual mandate 
compels individuals to enter the stream of commerce in violation of 
Sebelius and Congress’s Article I powers.83 
 C.  Severability 
The Court has traditionally conducted a three-step severability 
inquiry.84 The Court asks whether it “must retain those portions of the 
Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of functioning 
independently, and (3) consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in 
enacting the statute.”85 There is a presumption in favor of severability: 
if a statutory provision is found unconstitutional, the legislature will ask 
whether Congress would have preferred “‘what is left [of its statute] to 
no statute at all.”86 
Petitioners rely on Congress’s explicit notation that it preferred an 
ACA without the individual mandate over no ACA at all.87  
Accordingly, Petitioners contend that Congress intended for the rest of 
the ACA to remain intact even in the absence of the individual 
mandate. The Petitioners argue that the Court cannot “use its remedial 
powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature” and replace the will 
of the enacting Congress by using the individual mandate to eliminate 
the Act in its entirety.88 
 
 81.  Id. at 29. 
 82.  Brief for State Respondents, supra note 63, at 23 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519, 547–61 (2012)). 
 83.  Id. (citing 567 U.S. 519, 549, 552 (2012)). 
 84.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258−59 (2005) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 40 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)).  
 87.  Id. at 39; see also Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 
2054−58 (2017) (Congress repealed the associated penalty for failing to enroll for health insurance 
but did not disavow the entirety of the act when it had the opportunity to do so).  
 88.  Brief for State Respondents, supra note 63, at 36 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood 
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Further, Petitioners support this argument by noting that the TCJA 
“declawed” the individual mandate but maintained the rest of the 
ACA.89 With respect to severability, Petitioners note that when 
evaluating whether the deletion or replacement of a provision renders 
the entirety of a statute toothless, “we ask whether the law remains 
‘fully operative’ without the invalid provisions.”90 So although the 
TCJA “rendered Section 5000A(a) toothless, all of the remaining 
provisions of the ACA continued to operate as intended.”91 Petitioners 
claim that if Congress had intended for the ACA’s life to depend on the 
survival of the individual mandate, it would not have preserved the 
remainder of the ACA when it enacted the 2017 amendment.92 In other 
words, Congress must have considered the minimum coverage 
provision indispensable because it did not repeal the individual 
mandate.93 The combination of these two purposeful choices evinces 
Congress’ intent to preserve the ACA even in the absence of the 
individual mandate. 
The Court also asks whether the remainder of a statute will function 
the way Congress intended.94 In Alaska Airlines v. Brock, the Court 
found that “the unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the 
statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not 
have enacted.”95 Petitioners contend that the ACA functions the same, 
and solves the same healthcare provision issues that it was designed to 
confront even in the absence of the individual mandate.96 Respondents 
contend that, according to Alaska Airlines, a provision becomes 
inseverable if, once the offending language is removed, the statute 
would not function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.97 
The individual mandate, “not the associated tax penalty, is critical to 
 
of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)). 
 89.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 15. 
 90.  Id. at 38 (citing Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018) (quoting Free Enter. 
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010))). 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. at 37 (arguing that it is “‘inconceivable that Congress would have’ made the minimum 
coverage provision unenforceable while leaving the rest of the Act in place”) (citing J.A. at 481, 
California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (Nos. 19-840 & 19-1019)).                                                                                                                       
 93.  Id. at 26. Supporting this claim, the lower court also chose not to disregard the legislative 
findings in 42 U.S.C. § 18091, which spelled out the ACA’s effect on the national economy and 
interstate commerce. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  480 U.S. 678, 685 (1986). 
 96.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 38. 
 97.  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987). 
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the functioning of the ACA’s major features.”98 Respondents look to 
§ 18091(2)(1), explaining that if there was not a requirement to buy 
health insurance, adverse selection would likely arise—people would 
likely wait until they became sick to obtain health coverage.99 Further, 
Respondents argue that because the individual mandate penalty is 
“toothless,” it stymies the Act’s original purpose of reducing adverse 
selection, broadening the health insurance risk pool, and decreasing the 
cost of premiums.100 Therefore, a tax penalty is necessary to effectuate 
the ACA’s purpose of ensuring access to healthcare for all Americans 
regardless of pre-existing conditions or geographic locale. 
Petitioners also argue that in 2017, Congress had the opportunity to 
“repudiate or otherwise supersede” the Court’s holdings in Sebelius 
and King but instead chose to leave the remainder of the ACA 
unaltered.101 Accordingly, Congress acquiesced in these decisions. 
Respondents argued that congressional findings included in the ACA’s 
text indicate that Congress intended other provisions of the Act—
namely the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions—to 
survive in the absence of the individual mandate.102 Therefore, 
Respondents endorse the view that Congress’s lack of action does not 
indicate a preference for the individual mandate to remain. 
IV.  ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Court heard oral arguments for California v. Texas on 
November 10, 2020.103  The Court focused on the issue of standing for 
a substantial portion of the oral argument. Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Thomas questioned Petitioners about standing—specifically, 
whether the mandate has imposed on Respondents a cognizable injury, 
despite the fact that there is no legal consequence for failing to 
purchase insurance.104 Justice Thomas analogized the zero-dollar 
penalty to a local requirement requiring citizens to wear masks, 
reasoning that both actions have no legal consequences for violating 
 
 98.  Brief for State Respondents, supra note 63, at 30.  
 99.  Id. at 38. Adverse selection refers to the phenomenon wherein individuals waited until 
they became sick to purchase health insurance. As a result, insurers increased insurance premiums 
to offset for the increased costs of covering a higher proportion of sick people than initially 
expected. 
 100.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 45. 
 101.  Id. at 44. 
 102.  Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 17, at 13.  
 103.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-
840).  
 104.  Id. at 93.  
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the law.105 He followed up the analogy by questioning whether public 
disapproval is a valid reason to grant a challenger standing.106 
Petitioners responded that because the mandate is toothless and 
harmless, Respondents neither incurred, nor would it be possible to 
incur, an injury requisite for standing.107 Regarding the states’ increased 
costs for tracking and calculating eligibility, Justice Alito asked whether 
the increased cost could constitute an injury.108 Petitioners’ counsel 
responded that the reporting costs incurred by each State’s health 
exchange, the claimed injury, did not relate to the mandate.109 Justice 
Kavanaugh questioned whether it mattered that there is no 
enforcement mechanism, since people generally feel obliged to follow 
the law.110 Justice Barrett began to shift the conversation away from 
standing and towards the merits, asking whether it mattered that 
Congress reduced the mandate penalty to zero instead of repealing it.111 
Petitioners’ counsel took this question as an opportunity to address 
severability by noting that even if the mandate is unconstitutional, the 
rest of the law should not be invalidated.112 The Court did not 
substantially push back on the Petitioners’ argument. 
Respondents’ counsel endured intensive questioning, punctuated 
by a series of metaphors that illustrated the Court’s hesitancy to find 
the entire ACA unconstitutional. During Respondents’ argument, the 
Court again focused on standing. Justice Breyer analogized the 
individual mandate to laws passed by Congress that encourage people 
to do things but lack an enforcement mechanism—like buying war 
bonds or planting a tree.113 He noted that although these laws aim to 
incentivize action, failing to act triggers no negative repercussions. 
Therefore, if all penalty-less mandates were held unconstitutional, 
“there will be an awful lot of language in an awful lot of statutes that 
will suddenly be the subject of Court constitutional challenge.”114 
Justice Kavanaugh’s statement that he saw the mandate as severable 
from the rest of the ACA signaled the Court’s reliance on past 
 
 105.  Id. at 8.  
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. at 9. 
 108.  Id. at 13–15.  
 109.  Id. at 15.  
 110.  Id. at 27. 
 111.  Id. at 29.  
 112.  Id. at 31. 
 113.  Id. at 69, 98.   
 114.  Id. at 69–70.   
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precedent to employ a saving construction.115 When it appeared that 
the Justices were unconvinced by counsel’s severability argument, the 
Respondent conceded that the mandate is at least inseverable from the 
guaranteed-issue and community-ratings provisions.116 Although the 
Court spent some time on statutory interpretation and public policy 
arguments, it largely focused on the standing inquiry and indicated its 
reluctance to find the individual mandate inseverable. The oral 
argument suggests that the Court will find standing and rule on the 
Act’s constitutionality. The Court is likely to uphold the individual 
mandate and thus avoid the question of severability. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The individual mandate does not injure any of the Respondent-
plaintiffs and therefore they do not have standing.  The two individual 
Respondents face a lawful choice: purchase health insurance or don’t—
in either scenario, Respondents face no pecuniary or legal 
consequence.117 Any harm incurred would be self-inflicted—a  mere 
feeling of compulsion rather than a legally imposed injury.118 The Court 
previously articulated that, “Respondents cannot manufacture 
standing based on “hypothetical future harm” when there is a 
perceived threat that individuals will be subjected to the enforcement 
of an Act.119 Here, the notion that individuals “may” feel compelled to 
enroll in health insurance parallels the central issue in Clapper, wherein 
individuals thought that they “might” be subjected to surveillance.120 In 
Clapper, the Court held that Respondents’ self-inflicted injuries were 
not traceable to federal activity and the mere fear of surveillance does 
not lend itself to a tenable argument for standing.121 Therefore, the 
injury that the Respondents claim to have incurred is one that is purely 
“self-inflicted.”122 When Congress amended the individual mandate 
with the TCJA, it had the opportunity to repeal the rest of the ACA. 
But importantly, Congress chose not to do so.123 The only fact relevant 
in ascertaining intent is Congress’s choice to leave the rest of the statute 
 
 115.  Id. at 113 
 116.  Id. at 114. 
 117.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 49, at 8.  
 118.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013) (“[R]espondents cannot 
manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves . . . .”). 
 119.  Id. at 402.  
 120.  Id. at 404.  
 121.  Id. at 415–18. 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id.  
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intact when it eliminated the penalty for failing to purchase health 
insurance. 
A textualist interpretation supports an argument in favor of the 
individual mandate’s constitutionality.124 The use of the word “shall” 
alone is not dispositive and does not create an unlawful obligation to 
purchase health insurance.  In Sebelius, the Court noted that the use of 
the word “shall” historically connotes the word “should.”125 
Interpreting “shall” to imply a command would also be inconsistent 
with the precedent established by King v. Burwell.126 There, the Court 
emphasized the provision, “[e]ach State shall . . . establish an American 
Health Benefit Exchange . . . for the State” and noted that if a state 
chose not to establish its own exchange, the federal government would 
create an insurance marketplace in which citizens could purchase 
health insurance.127 Courts always strive to interpret terminology 
within the same act consistently; because the Court previously 
interpreted “shall” in a way that is harmonious with use in statutes 
concerning the same subject and consistent with the other uses of  
“shall” within the ACA itself, it is logical to for the Court to continue 
to interpret “shall” permissively.128 Therefore, the Respondents err in 
arguing that the only interpretation of the individual mandate is that of 
an unconstitutional command.129 The doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance also supports this interpretation. When there are two 
plausible constructions, one that is constitutional and one that is not, 
the Court will adopt the constitutionally-sound construction. 
Therefore, the use of “shall” in the ACA cannot be seen as denoting a 
command, as previous Court decisions have rejected this conclusion. 
If the individual mandate is found unconstitutional, it is still 
severable from the rest of the Affordable Care Act. Severability 
doctrine relies on two main principles rooted in statutory 
 
 124.  LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 130–31 (Carolina 
Academic Press, 2d ed. 2018).   
 125.  567 U.S. 519, 522–23 (2012). Likewise, in New York v. United States, the Court 
interpreted “shall” to be permissive. The Court stated that the phrase “shall be responsible for 
providing . . . for the disposal of . . . low-level radioactive waste” was inclusive and even though 
the Court could presumably interpret shall “alone and in isolation” it could be also interpreted as 
a command. 505 U.S 144, 170 (1992). 
 126.  576 U.S. 473, 487 (2015). 
 127.  Id. at 483 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)). 
 128.  See JELLUM, supra note 124, at 131 (noting that, “when the legislature uses the same 
word in different parts of the same act, the legislature intended those words to have the same 
meaning. And contrariwise, if the legislature uses a word in one part of the act, then changes to a 
different word in the same act, the legislature intended to change the meaning”). 
 129.  505 U.S 144, 177 (1992).  
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interpretation. First, courts must “try not to nullify more of a 
legislature’s work than is necessary” because “[a] ruling of 
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives 
of the people.”130 If the Court determines that there is a “constitutional 
flaw,” it is required to sever the “problematic portions while leaving the 
remainder intact.”131 Second, the Court must analyze Congress’s 
legislative intent as the Court is not permitted to “use its remedial 
powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.”132 The Court must 
ask whether the legislature would prefer to have a portion of the statute 
or no statute at all.133 When the intent of Congress is unclear, the Court 
often tries to discern their collective intent by asking whether the 
surviving portions of the statute will “remain[] ‘fully operative as a law’ 
with the unconstitutional provision ‘excised.’”134 Here, Congress 
intended that the rest of the ACA remain in place with an 
unenforceable individual mandate. Congress, rather than the Court, 
eliminated the enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate. 
When Congress did so, it left the rest of the provisions in place. During 
the enactment of the TCJA, Congress could have amended the statute 
to remove the individual mandate and leave other provisions like the 
community-rating and guaranteed issue requirements in place. In short, 
inaction is a choice. By way of negative inference, choosing not to 
repeal the individual mandate altogether clearly illustrated Congress’s 
intent to keep the ACA alive. 
CONCLUSION 
If the ACA is repealed, millions of Americans stand to lose their 
health insurance, nearly doubling the number of people without 
coverage.135 The individual mandate currently has no enforcement 
mechanism so any injury sustained is self-inflicted. As a result, the 
 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006) (quoting 
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 132.  Id. at 330 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)). 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010) 
(holding that unconstitutional portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were severable because “[w]ith 
the tenure restrictions excised, the Act remains ‘fully operative as a law’”) (quoting New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)).   
 135.  How Would Repealing the Affordable Care Act Affect Health Care and Jobs in Your 
State?, ECON. POLICY INST. (2016), https://www.epi.org/aca-obamacare-repeal-impact/.  
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Respondent-plaintiffs do not have standing. Nevertheless, the mandate 
is constitutional because a lawful choice is presented to all consumers, 
and because it is a valid exercise of Congressional power. If, however, 
the Court deems the mandate unconstitutional, the mandate is still 
severable from the remainder of the ACA. Congressional action shows 
that they intended for the rest of the ACA to remain in place even if 
the individual mandate is struck down. The Court should uphold the 
individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congressional power 
and ensure that all Americans have access to health insurance 
coverage. 
